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 II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A.    Idaho’s Implied Consent Statute Did Not Justify the Blood Draw  
 Because the Trooper Lacked Reasonable Grounds to Believe  
 Lawrence Lutton Drove Under the Influence  
 The police officers who initially stopped the vehicle in Mr. Lutton was a 
passenger did not conduct a DUI investigation or FSTs at the hospital because they 
turned their investigation over to the ISP trooper. The trooper, on the other hand, 
understood his sole purpose was to obtain the blood sample and believed other 
officers had already conducted an investigation. There was no other evidence of 
impairment such as bloodshot eyes, impaired memory or slurred speech.  In short, 
unlike cases where a driver’s admission to minimal drinking was coupled with signs 
of impairment, nothing in Mr. Lutton’s presentation contradicted his statement that 
he had stopped drinking more than six hours before the accident. 
In Mr. Lutton’s opening brief, he argued that the officer’s detection of the 
slight odor of an alcoholic beverage at the passenger window was of limited 
significance, especially considering that the officers and medical personnel who 
later interacted directly with Mr. Lutton noted neither an alcoholic odor nor signs of 
impairment. In response, the state asserts that: “it is perfectly understandable that 
Officer Anjelkovich would smell alcohol upon first contact with Lutton and Officer 
Zimmer and Trooper Vance would not – because Lutton’s clothes had been removed 
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and he was receiving medical treatment.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 12-13. The state’s 
reasoning is incorrect for several reasons. 
First, before traveling to the hospital, Mr. Lutton repeatedly dove into the 
water for at least thirty minutes trying to find his young son until bystanders forced 
him to stop. Exhibit A, 12:34-13:40; Tr. p. 38, ln. 24 – p. 39, ln. 7; p. 90, ln. 15-21. 
Second, the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Mr. Lutton breath and pores would be 
indicative of impairment, not any odor on his clothes. Finally, both city officers — 
Anjelkovich and Zimmer — spent several minutes interacting with Mr. Lutton in 
the treatment room before the trooper arrived. Given that neither officer, the 
trooper or medical personnel noted an alcoholic odor or any sign of impairment 
during their extended interactions with Mr. Lutton, the slight alcoholic odor 
emanating from the vehicle is of limited significance.  
 The officer’s detection of a slight alcoholic odor at the passenger window, Mr. 
Lutton’s indication that he had three beers more than nine hours before the 
accident and his loss of control on a narrow dirt road after hitting washboard while 
driving a two-wheel drive vehicle at dusk are insufficient to establish reasonable 
grounds to believe Mr. Lutton was driving intoxicated. The district court erred in 
denying Mr. Lutton’s motion to suppress.  
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B. Even if the BAC Request was Supported by Reasonable Grounds, Mr. 
Lutton Did Not Continue to Provide Voluntary Consent to the Blood 
Draw and the Search and Seizure Cannot Be Upheld Based on 
Implied Consent  
To be voluntary, consent based upon Idaho's implied consent statute must 
overcome two hurdles: (1) drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily; and (2) 
drivers must continue to give voluntary consent. State v. Charlson, 160 Idaho 610, 
617, 377 P.3d 1073, 1080 (2016); State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265, 371 P.3d 316, 
319 (2016). The state must prove that consent was voluntary under the totality of 
the circumstances. Charlson, 160 Idaho at 617, 377 P.3d at 1080. Neither verbal nor 
physical resistance is required to withdraw implied consent.” Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 
371 P.3d 316.  
According to the state, Mr. Lutton’s “argument that his consent was not valid 
because he was not allowed to see his son is not supported by the record, because 
the district court did not find his testimony on that subject credible.” Respondent’s 
Brief, p. 18. However, Mr. Lutton does not challenge the district court’s credibility 
finding in this appeal. Instead, the undisputed evidence — including the audio 
recording and officer testimony that was credited by the district court — establish 
that Mr. Lutton did not continue to provide voluntary consent at the time officers 
seized his blood.  
Further, the district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Lutton had to 
“unequivocally” revoke implied consent and, thus, failed to apply the correct 
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standard by considering whether the consent was voluntary based on the totality of 
the circumstances. Applying the correct standard, whether the trooper explicitly 
informed Mr. Lutton that he could not see his son until following the blood draw is 
not controlling and is instead simply one circumstance in a myriad factors.   
Similarly, that the officers neither handcuffed Mr. Lutton nor yelled at him 
establishes that his consent was voluntary. Rather, as discussed more fully in Mr. 
Lutton’s opening brief, the typical person facing the circumstances described in the 
trooper’s testimony and reflected on the audio recording would have believed the 
blood test was mandatory and that he could see his sons and have other visitors 
after the trooper had obtained his blood.  
 The audio recording reviewed by the district court establishes that the 
officers evicted Mr. Lutton’s visitors and informed him that he “needed” to give the 
officer his blood. Exhibit A, 18:40-19:10, 22:00-22:30; see also Exhibit A, 24:20-25:00 
(after officers evicted Mr. Lutton’s visitors, an employee entered the room, informed 
Mr. Lutton his sister had arrived, indicated that she knew Mr. Lutton could not 
have visitors at the moment and inquired whether Mr. Lutton wanted visitors once 
the officers were “done”). Once the trooper arrived, the two officers positioned 
themselves outside Mr. Lutton’s door. Shortly before the actual blood draw, the 
trooper’s testimony was that Mr. Lutton’s gravely injured two-year-old arrived and 
the trooper told Mr. Lutton he had to wait to see him. Tr. p. 23, ln. 4-24. The totality 
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of the circumstances (without considering Mr. Lutton’s own testimony about what 
the trooper told him) establishes that Mr. Lutton’s will was overborne and that his 
consent was involuntary. 
 Particularly in light of Mr. Lutton’s extremely vulnerable subjective 
condition, his cooperation during the blood draw does not establish voluntary 
consent. The district court erred in finding that Mr. Lutton voluntarily consented to 
the blood draw and in denying his motion to suppress. 
 III.  CONCLUSION   
The district court erred in determining that the officers had reasonable 
grounds to believe that Mr. Lutton had been driving under the influence. Even if 
there were sufficient grounds to request a BAC test, Mr. Lutton did not continue to 
voluntarily consent at the time his blood was seized. For all the reasons set forth 
above and in Mr. Lutton’s opening brief, he respectfully asks this Court to vacate 
the district court’s order withholding judgment and remand with instruction to 
allow Mr. Lutton to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October 2016. 
       FYFFE LAW 
        /s/  Robyn Fyffe           
 ROBYN FYFFE 
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